Israel, four offensive campaigns that all succeeded. Perhaps Iran-Iraq could be called a peer conflict in which there was at least a stalemate by positional warfare. That said, the likelihood is that the US will conduct hybrid wars against non-peers and we should be preparing for that. Sir, let's define the terms. What do you call defense? Active defenses. What will you achieve by placing 2nd Cavalry in the suburbs of Tallinn or Riga? You want to give the political leadership of Latvia and Estonia leverage to manipulate the White House and the Pentagon? What is the strategic goal?
In the Crimea people loyal to Russia. The FSB and the authorities managed to ensure first neutrality, and then loyalty, even among of the Crimean Tatars. Why capture the Baltic States, if these countries can be neutralized economically? The result can be seen now. Decent work without knowledge of the Russian language is simply not there. All local industry died as unnecessary. And now many people in Brussels are wondering if this market is worth the money.
In this regard, the question arises, how ready are the soldiers of the 2nd Dragoon to burn in the flames of tactical nuclear strikes I think there will be three, according to the number of battalion defense areas if the efforts of politicians to knock out money for" the only barrier from Russian aggression " get out of control? I like your comment the most.
It is closest to my own assessment. Another consideration absent here is with our forces in such proximity, how would Russia or the U. There are some good insights here, but others are inexperianced junior officers playing general. It's just too bad our guns couldn't elevate high enough to mass fires on the storks. With regard to the ease of degrading or destroying an IADS, it depends on which conflict one refers to. Operation Allied Force Kosovo, and the air war in Vietnam provide some contrary examples.
The difference was that the Serb operators were much better-trained and employed the disciplined Russian tactics to a fuller extent. While not impossible to take down, modern IADS do constitute a credible means of deterrence because of the uncertainty inherent in the cost required to penetrate them.
Future Armies, Future Challenges: Land warfare in the information age - Google Books
I agree in essence with Jim Greer. The things that make getting your preparation for the next war "correct" almost impossible include the inevitable gap between your preparation and the myriad realities of the complexity of the practice of war. Given the global responsibilities of the US, given the advantages of autocratic states in their immediate neighborhood, and given the eventual peace dividend which we have not seen yet since victory in the Cold War, the operative challenge is to prepare enough of the intellectual backbone of educated officers, and an expansible economy and weapons industry, and, hardest of all, national will to defeat the autocratic states in their neigborhoods.
Couching the challenges we face in the next several decades in nearly entirely theoretical terms, and glossing over the practical issues which can only be solved by the professional officer corps, gives this analysis something of the flavor of a bit too much fancy terminology, and insufficient cataloging of the challenges of practice.
As an old timer who lived through the Cold War and the era of Active Defense, I would like to offer the following commentary on this well written and researched piece. It is representative of the intellectual thinking that Dr.
I do, however, concur with Dr. Jim Greer correctly points out the examples of the success of current doctrine. The authors ignore those examples at their peril. Greer does, however, overlook the fact that Active Defense and previous doctrines did play a role in the eventual fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War; a fact I think should not be dismissed out of hand.
Doing so ignores the fact that the world after WWII weathered a myriad of serious crises Korea, Vietnam, Suez, Cuba, proxy wars in Africa, and the Arab-Israeli conflicts to name a few without resorting to the use of nuclear weapons. While I agree that nuclear proliferation does muddy the waters, I refuse to accept the inevitability of the use of nuclear weapons. That being said, I do support their construct that any future doctrine must give more attention to counter-nuclear defense-something I see as lacking in current doctrine. Schifferle touches upon the most critical factor I believe is missing from the original argument—the role of national will.
The absence of national will, however defined, is fatal to the success of any military endeavor in the long run.kamishiro-hajime.info/voice/camera-de/espionner-un-mobile-android.php
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Additionally, I would posit that the lack of a real base of national support for any policy surrounding the current Iraqi situation has hampered the efforts of Bush 43, Obama, and Trump administrations to achieve any actual resolution. Future doctrine must be adaptive to the many scenarios that the authors and commentators have addressed. Again, agreeing with Schifferle I caution against becoming too theoretical in the discussion. Continue the discussions but focus on the practical.
Good insight. The title is a bit pretentious, but there are several correct points.
The most precious is this one: "…empowering allied nations to meaningfully resource forward security postures that deny adversary initiative in all domains instead of literally funding the Russian and Chinese militaries through counterproductive trade policies. After taking time to reflect on the arguments in this essay, I would ask the authors to review their military history if they ever received it due to cuts in PME over the years and study the Strategy of Appeasement that was encouraged by British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain during the interwar years.
Many of us are also very familiar with the George Santayana quote that "Those who do not remember the past are condemned to repeat it. Poland was invaded on 1 September Those who support the Modern War Institute proposition, are asking for the rest of us to end up in the same predicament of For those of us that served in Germany during the Cold War, we knew what it felt like to be prepared to fight outnumbered and win. Never mind that we were potentially outnumbered by a ratio of five-to-one in certain GDP sectors. The "Risk Embracing" Mentality was prevalent in the early 's thanks to the confidence in the Reagan Build-up and the warfighting concept to go along with the material procurement.
The willingness to embrace a War with Limited Nuclear exchanges was a foundational underpinning for the Cold War force. The Big Five were tactical systems but highly representative of an Operational Maneuver mindset. In my mind, the reflections of a Positional Warfare strategy leads me to remember the failed Maginot Line fortress of the French, and highly representative of their defensive mindset.
Army's warfighting concept of Multi-Domain Operations reflects an offensive maneuverist approach to warfare. In an age of opportunistic and predatorial leaders such as Putin; an offensive mindset and offensive strategies will prove to be far more effective than the PM Neville Chamberlain proposals of the mid 's. Also, a Neville Chamberlain approach will foster a debilitating and demoralizing effect on junior leaders in the force of tomorrow.
Large scale conflict nation versus nation as opposed to proxy versus proxy is highly unlikely due to several constraints each exclusive to one another. The use of economic sanctions in the modern day can be a potent weapon when employed properly. Given this fact, another deterrent is added to the equation that restrains nations from direct large scale conflict…the totality of lethality that comes from losses attributed to direct conflict, nuclear engagement, economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation would be staggering Smith, The Utility of Force and Boot, War Made New Any three of the four can combine to cripple a nation, one of the four is unto itself lethal…nuclear engagement.
Nuclear engagement can not be controlled as it is no longer just in the hands of the Russians and Americans. Try to imagine a conflict where either the US or Russia uses nuclear weapons that doesn't pull in the outlying nuclear powers…Israel, Pakistan, India, China, North Korea. Can anyone reasonably imagine a nuclear exchange between the US and Russia not prompting nuclear exchanges between long held rivals such as India and Pakistan, or Israel and Iran, or North Korea and everybody else? The threat of national annihilation that would result from a direct conflict between near peer military powers on a large scale is too painful to contemplate or risk ask the Soviets or the Europeans.
So the debate about strategies and tactics involving large industrial nation conflict is academic unless a devastating series of events would force one nation or group of nation to attack, which in that "Black Swan" scenario all bets and preparations are for naught as the defender would be dealing with a suicidal attacker and there is no preparation a reasonable nation can afford to prepare for in that situation.
So as much as theorists abhor "impossible" scenarios, the current parameters of international trade and relations combined with nuclear deterrence makes large scale conflict between industrial nations so remote as to be near impossible. Fear of nuclear conflict is what the Russian military expects from decadent Western nations. By not preparing for a nuclear conflict, the U. Credible deterrence relies upon capability and will. While the U. The Russian military approach in Georgia, Crimea and Eastern Ukraine has been to initiate clandestine preparatory actions followed by an aggressive takeover of foreign territory.
Upon accomplishing a rapid takeover, the threat of a defensive nuclear umbrella is all that is needed to secure territorial gains. The threat of Nuclear escalation without a credible NATO response will ensure that the Russian military can continue its hostile territorial seizures unhampered. This playbook will be replayed simply because U. Fear of a nuclear conflict is exactly what Putin expects to exploit U.
The capability to respond is deterrence, the Russians can continue with their games because the us and nato has decided that absense of an existential threat, nuclear weapons are not an option because there is no limited use of these weapon systems. Armchair academics can question the political will of the nato counties but with no actual skin in the game you simply will continue this shallow analysis that every act of aggression should be met with a big foot in the ass or else we look weak.
This article raises interesting ideas massive and conventional assaults are not sufficient to win. But the demonstration is not convincing because of confusions. I do not believe that the nuclear counter-strike is an enabling capability relevant only for the "bad states" Iran, China and Russia.
This capability is worth for the USA too. Moreover, I do not believe that China and Russia may use nuclear weapons just to protect extra-territorial gains.